OCM CALLS FOR MORATORIUM ON PACKER MERGERS

ORGANIZATION FOR COMPETITIVE MARKETS
P.O. Box 6486
Lincoln, NE 68506
Web site: www.competitivemarkets.com
Date:  November 14, 2000                        For Immediate Release

Contact:            Fred Stokes: 662-476-5568
                        Doug O’Brien: 860-379-6199

OCM CALLS FOR MORATORIUM ON PACKER MERGERS 

The Organization for Competitive Markets called today for a two-year moratorium on meat packer/processor mergers.  OCM is reacting to the recent announcement that Smithfield, the country’s largest hog packer and hog producer, has offered to acquire IBP, Inc., the country’s largest beef packer and second largest hog packer. 

“Livestock producers, and especially hog farmers, would be injured enormously by this acquisition,” said Fred Stokes, president of OCM.  “With the increased consolidation, loss of a buyer, and Smithfield’s increased ability to manipulate prices, farmers and ranchers are guaranteed to see lower prices.” 

“The antitrust laws, as they are interpreted by the courts today, may very well be insufficient to deal with the harm that packer concentration causes to producers,” said Doug O’Brien, attorney for OCM.  “The only true remedy at this time is to take a time out, temporarily halt meat packer mergers, and assess the harm done to competition in the agricultural marketplace.” 

“The biggest danger is that the Department of Justice will treat it like the Continental/Cargill merger, where DoJ only merely looked at some of the areas where the markets directly overlapped and forced some limited divestiture,” said Michael Stumo, General Counsel for OCM.  “In such a case, DoJ would appear to be doing its job, but we would end up with a far more concentrated and less competitive market.” 

Smithfield currently possesses 18.4% of the nation’s hog slaughter capacity while IBP possesses 17.7%.  IBP has one-third of the nation’s beef processing capacity.�
Smithfield’s slaughter capacity is focused in the Mid-Atlantic with only two plants in the Midwest.  In contrast, the bulk of IBP’s hog processing is in the Midwest.  Significantly, the two firms differ in their approach to acquiring hogs.  Smithfield owns a majority of the hogs it slaughters with a reported goal of becoming 100% vertically integrated.  IBP purchases its hogs through marketing contracts and on the open market. 

OCM vigorously opposes the acquisition as one of the most egregious examples of the wave of mergers within agribusiness.  Specifically, the merger would: 

1. Further concentrate the meatpacking sector towards even more anticompetitive evels.  The acquisition of IBP by Smithfield would remove the largest player (IBP) in the cash market for hogs.  The result will be even lower prices.

2. Hasten the vertical integration of the hog and cattle sectors.  Smithfield’s business plan focuses upon aggressive vertical integration.  It owns about 60% of the hogs it processes and has marketing contracts for many other hogs, thereby limiting its open market bidding.  It will certainly impose that model on IBP pork and beef plants.

3. Allow Smithfield to continue it pattern of shutting down plants to decrease slaughter capacity and lower prices within the industry.  Smithfield has a pattern of purchasing and then shutting down hog slaughter plants, such as Dakota Pork in Huron, South Dakota and the Farmland plant in Dubuque, Iowa.  Smithfield CEO Joseph Luter, III, is on record complaining of too much slaughter capacity in the pork industry.

4. Greatly increase Smithfield’s ability to manipulate prices.  Most formula-priced hogs in both the Midwest and throughout the country are based on cash prices in the Midwest.  The acquisition would make it much more possible for Smithfield to depress cash prices in the Midwest, and therefore depress prices across the nation.

5. Create new barriers to entry in the wholesale to retail meat trade.  Smithfield and IBP have large contracts for supplying red meat to WalMart and other large retailers.  In the instance of WalMart, Smithfield would consolidate its position as a supplier.  New competitors will face even higher barriers to entry.  “Whether it’s Congress or the Department of Justice, someone must step up to the plate to stop this acquisition and protect independent farmers and ranchers,” said Stokes. 

The Organization for Competitive Markets is a multidisciplinary, nonprofit group of farmers, ranchers, academics, attorneys, and policy makers dedicated to reclaiming the agricultural marketplace for independent farmers, ranchers and rural communities.

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IBP’s Liability Not Off Hook Despite Court Ruling, Say Cattlemen’s Lawyers

October 24, 2000 NEWS RELEASE       

Cattlemen’s Legal Fund
785-332-3344
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IBP’s Liability Not Off Hook Despite Court Ruling,
Say Cattlemen’s Lawyers

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WHEN FEDERAL JUDGE, Lyle Strom, denied Class Certification in the ongoing class-action lawsuit, many in the beef industry jumped to the conclusion that the case was over.
Nothing could be further from the truth, say the Plaintiffs’ lawyers, noting that steps are now underway to redefine the “class” in a new form which will win Court approval, and allow the case to proceed to trial.

“Nobody except the defendant, IBP, and their supporters deny the truth of our claims. The facts in this case are clear and on our side, but so far, the law and procedures are not. The lawyers must and will use the truth to get IBP to trial and get a judgment,” said one of the plaintiff’s attorneys, Randy Beard.

“Even if we end up with only one plaintiff, this case will go to trial.”

Cattle producers are of the opinion that they were once again denied the justice they could expect from the court. Judge Strom had the broad discretion to define a “class” acceptable to the Court, and to forward this case for trial. Yet he decided, instead, to almost let IBP off the hook, they say.
“Regardless of IBP’s claims,” said Mike Callicrate, one of the original Plaintiffs, “There’s no doubt that IBP is depressing prices to producers through their illegal use of captive supplies and other methods.
“It’s unfortunate that because a method of distributing damages can’t be agreed upon, that this agricultural plunderer should get off the hook. Cattle producers don’t care about damage awards, they care about stopping the illegal behavior of IBP that is forcing them out of business,” he said.
Callicrate pointed out that USDA has failed miserably in its enforcement responsibilities of the very powerful, market protecting Packers and Stockyards Act (P&S Act).

As a result, he said, “They’re now leaving a few independent cattlemen and private lawyers saddled with the enormous task of restoring competition and fair prices to the cattle industry.”

“Congress placed the P&S Act in the hands of the Secretary of Agriculture to enforce,” Callicrate stated. “The Act was passed in 1921 to prevent the, then powerful and monopolistic, meatpacking cartel from ever again exerting abusive market power, which brought down the cattle industry in the early 1900’s. In 1921, five packers controlled less than fifty percent of the market compared to four, controlling over eighty percent today.”

Another of the Plaintiff’s attorneys, David Domina, stated in a client communication that, “Nothing in the Order expresses any judgment, or hint of judgment, about the legality of IBP’s conduct or the propriety of its market practices. The ruling is not a commentary on the use of captive supplies.”
As a rebuttal to IBP’s claim that supply and demand have been the primary cause of low cattle prices, Domina wrote:

“Strong evidence has developed during this case–through the course of nearly a hundred depositions and tens of thousands of pages of materials–to prove a cause-effect relationship between captive supply usage and cash price changes.”

“Cattlemen throughout the industry,” said Callicrate, “Are now awaiting the next development which should be a redefining of the “class” and the setting of a trial date and seeing justice done in a Federal Alabama courtroom.”
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Cattlemen’s Legal Fund

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USDA Hearings Held In Denver Secretary Glickman A No Show.

USDA Hearings Held In Denver Secretary Glickman A No Show.
By Leesa Kiewel

Shane Kolb, Meadow, SD, Chairman of the Western Organization of Resource Council’s Ag Issue Team wasn’t surprised that Shania Twain didn’t show up for the USDA Hearings in Denver on September 21.  Kolb wasn’t surprised that Ag Secretary Dan Glickman didn’t show either.

“There’s a new country song on the charts right now by Bill Engvall that describes the word ‘awesome’,” said Kolb in a moment of levity.  “According to Engvall, awesome would occur in my life if Shania Twain met me at my motel room door wearing nothing but a fur coat, holding a note from my wife that said ‘have a good time’.  There’s a greater chance that Ms. Twain will meet me at my door this evening than there is any chance at all of USDA adopting the WORC petition and restoring any chance I have to a fair and equitable cattle market,” he said.

With that statement, the USDA public forum on captive supplies in Denver got underway. Approximately 200 spectators were on hand at the Denver Airport Holiday Inn to listen as the panelists testified regarding the WORC petition.  The petition, which was filed with USDA in October 1996 calls
for a firm, fixed-base price on forward contracts and asks that cattle ownership by packers be prohibited unless they are offered for bid in an open and public manner.

The latest round of USDA-scheduled hearings, is suggested by USDA officials as an attempt to gather further evidence on the issue.  Others like Kathleen Kelly, Vice-President of R-Calf, say the hearings are just another attempt to make producers ‘feel like something is being done, when in reality nothing is being done.’  The proceedings were video taped by USDA. The day-long hearings consisted of three panels.  Panel One was identified as Industry Experts including Kolb, Rosemary Mucklow, Executive Director National Meat Association; Chuck Hassebrook, Program Director Center For Rural Affairs; George Hall, President National Cattlemen’s Beef Association; Michael Stumo, General Counsel Organization For Competitive Markets; Ken Bull, Vice-President for Procurement Excel Corporation; Dave Carter, President Rocky Mountain Farmers Union; Gary Teague, President Teague Diversified, Inc.

Teague, a cattle feeder from northeastern Colorado and Kolb, a rancher from northwestern South Dakota were the only producers visible on the panels. Panel Two, identified as Academic Experts, included Dr. Neil Harl, Professor of Economics, Iowa State University; Dr. Ted Schroeder, Professor of Agricultural Economics, Kansas State University; Dr. Peter Carstensen, George H. Young-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School; Dr. Wayne Purcell, Professor of Agricultural Economics, Virginia Tech; Dr. Catherine Durham, Assistant Professor and Ag Economist, Oregon State University; Dr. John Schroeter, Associate Professor of Economics, Iowa State University.

Panel Three, which concluded the day’s events was moderated by James Baker, Administrator USDA Grain Inspection Packers and Stockyards Administration, was a question and answer session including all panelists.  USDA required that questions for the panelists be written on index cards and submitted prior to the final session.

Panel One, which convened at 8:00 a.m., and Panel Two, convening in the afternoon, were provided with five questions to supplement discussions held during the forum.The National Meat Association, National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, Excel Corporation and Teaque squared off against Kolb, representing WORC, the Center for Rural Affairs, Organization for Competitive Markets and Rocky Mountain Farmer’s Union to debate the causes and effects of the petition, and to present their respective organization’s policy on the issue.

Under the watchful eye of IBP Vice-President of Cattle Procurement Bruce Bass and representatives of Texas Cattle Feeders and Kansas Livestock Association, George Hall, NCBA President presented current NCBA policy saying, “NCBA will not recommend the limitation of any method of marketing fed cattle.  NCBA supports a free market system where buyers and sellers negotiate contracts for their own mutual benefit.  No action is to be taken to alter or halt current trends toward private business arrangements among operators in the various sectors of the beef industry.  While we empathize with current low prices experienced by grain producers in the face of recent record production  prices for calves and yearlings have increased and farmers and ranchers have recovered from the crisis of 1996.  Conditions have improved dramatically since the doldrums of the mid-1990’s.  NCBA is an organization where decisions are made democratically.  We have an open forum for debate, discussion and deliberative policy making.  NCBA policy is not determined by staff, university researchers or by chance.  Our membership has consistently said that we want access to business opportunities that help us improve our bottom line.  If policy were enacted that would ban packer ownership or control of livestock, the marketplace would go back to ‘buying on the average’, in essence, allowing packers to pay less for higher quality livestock.  This would impact the bottom line of many producers who utilize grid formulas and value-based marketing systems to achieve a premium.  Such a policy would hurt producers, which is why NCBA has policy opposing any legislation that would ban packer-ownership or control of livestock.”

Hall prefaced his comments saying, “NCBA is a producer-directed and consumer-focused trade association of America’ cattle farmers and ranchers, and the marketing organization for the largest segment of the nation’s food and fiber industry.”

Kolb responded to Hall’s statement saying, “I can appreciate concerns about the global market, and the benefits achieved through support of a global marketplace by a national organization.  From where I sit, I sell to one buyer and that’s usually Cargill.  Cargill might be reaping the benefits of a global market but they aren’t sharing them with me,” he said.

Teague, pointing to empty chairs, asked why more producers weren’t present at the hearings.  “I know why they aren’t here,” he said.  “We’ve got $1.10 five weight calves, and producers are happy now.  They don’t come to meetings like this when they’re satisfied with their markets,” he stated.  Although the hearings were well controlled, Teague’s remark brought a response from a member of the audience who said, “You’ve got it wrong.  They’re not here because they’re broke.”  During the question and answer session Teague was asked if he had packer owned cattle in his Colorado feedlot, and he responded that he did.  When Baker asked if he would like to expound on that fact, Teague declined.

Excel’s Procurement Vice-President, Ken Bull was absent during the question and answer session to the dismay of some.  “It’s not right that one of the panelists didn’t participate in the final session,” said a Wyoming producer.  “If USDA solicited panelists like Bull they should have ensured his availability for the question and answer process or he shouldn’t have been allowed to participate,” he said.

At the conclusion of the hearing, WORC officials expressed concern that the process would not result in definitive action by USDA under the Glickman Administration.  “We knew going in this hearing process was mostly a dog and pony show.  However, the academic experts all admitted that we have a dysfunctional cattle market today  and that’s a first.  They don’t necessarily agree on the solutions necessary to remedy the crisis, but they all agreed publicly that more bidding is necessary,” said Don Nelson, Keene, ND, Chairman of the Dakota Resource Council, an affiliate of WORC.

“You have to question the process when one of the experts on the panel is on the IBP payroll as a paid expert witness in the Pickett vs. IBP case,” he said.  “One of the most positive things to come out of the Denver hearing are the number of alllies who have signed onto the WORC petition.  During the Denver hearing, the Colorado Cattlemen’s Association, Oregon Cattlemen’s Association, Wyoming Stockgrowers Association, the Livestock Marketing Association, Kansas Cattleman’s Association all came on board.  This is quickly growing into a coordinated effort amongst organizations that represent hundreds of thousands of producers across the nation,” said Nelson.

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Written Testimony of Organization for Competitive Markets

Written Testimony of
Organization for Competitive Markets

 
Presented by
Michael C. Stumo
General Counsel
 
Before the USDA’s Public Forum on
Captive Supplies in the Livestock Sector

 
Denver, Colorado
September 21, 2000
 
OCM
Organization for Competitive Markets
P.O. Box 6468
Lincoln, NE 68506
 
Tel: 662.476.5568
Fax: 208.275.6421
www.competitivemarkets.comTable of Contents

Executive Summary. 1
Part One:  OCM’s Response to Questions Submitted by the Secretary. 3
Question 1: Anticompetitive effects of captive supplies. 3
Question 2: Suggestions for further regulations. 3
Question 3: Consolidation, alleged efficiencies and competition. 4
Question 4: Positive and negative effects of captive supplies. 5
Question 5: Competition and rural communities. 6
Part Two: OCM Analysis of Proposed Rule on Captive Supply Practices. 8

I.      Introduction. 8
II.      The Secretary Possesses  the Authority to Promulgate Rules Limiting Captive Supply and Price Discrimination under the Packers and Stockyards Act 8
A.    Congress delegated unsurpassed legislative-style rulemaking ability to the Secretary under the Packers & Stockyards Act 8
B.    Facts found by the Secretary will not be second guessed, especially where, as here, such facts are general and legislative rather than specific and adjudicative. 9
C.    The Secretary has tremendous authority to determine which technical evidence and expert opinions he will accept in the rulemaking process. 10
III.         The Evidence and Well-Accepted Economic Theory Shows that Captive Supplies Violate the P&S Act 11
A.    Studies are unanimous in finding a negative correlation between captive supplies and prices  11
B.    Reliance on well-accepted economic models show that captive supplies cause lower prices  12
C.    The unprecedented intertemporal arbitrage theory posited by Schroeter and Azzam to explain how captive supplies might not cause lower prices is implausible. 14
D.    Thin markets increase the ability for manipulation. 15
E.    Captive supplies limit or eliminate the ability of producers to hedge price risk through the futures markets. 16
F.     Captive supplies cause declines in futures market prices. 16
IV.        Industry Claims of Efficiency or Other Benefits are Unrelated to the P&S Act 17
A.    If the Secretary concludes that captive supplies has the effect of controlling or manipulating the market, or that they are unfair, efficiency arguments are not applicable. 17
B.    Even if there are benefits to partial integration, those benefits are unaffected by the WORC rule  18
V.    Conclusion. 20
Part Three: OCM Analysis on Proposed Price Discrimination Regulations. 21
A.    The Secretary should promulgate a rule on price discrimination in the hog and cattle markets  21
B.    A rational price discrimination rule should define allowable reasons for discrimination and disallow all others as violative of public policy. 23
C.    An evidentiary burden shifting provision should also be included in a price discrimination rule  24
  
Executive Summary
 
The Organization for Competitive Markets (OCM) would like to thank the Secretary and the Department of Agriculture for investigating whether to promulgate rules dealing with competition problems in the livestock industry.  OCM is a multidisciplinary nonprofit organization with a mission of reclaiming the agricultural marketplace for independent farmers, ranchers and rural communities.  Our membership includes farmers, ranchers, attorneys, agricultural economists, rural sociologists, anthropologists, nonprofit leaders and business persons. 
 
The core focus of OCM is competition policy in the agriculture sector.  In our view, a diverse, atomistic structure at all levels of the food system is most likely to allocate resources properly and produce beneficial results for the broader public.  As we the number of firms declines at the farm input level, the processor level, the food manufacturing level and the retail level, the result is an incremental decrease in vigorous price competition.  Sometimes the reduction in competition is subtle, only detectable by those participating in the market daily.  At other times, the reduction in competition can actually be measured through aggregate numbers.
 
Many have made claims of efficiency gains.  Efficiency is “probably the most confusing word in economics” and efficiency measures are of “severely limited usefulness.”[1]  More significantly, under the present industry structure, alleged benefits from efficiency are not widely distributed, notably not to farmers or consumers.  This is a misallocation of resources problem.  The depressed agricultural sector in the context of a booming economy does not lend support to those who tout efficiency.  The Department of Justice sensibly treats efficiency claims as suspect in merger review analysis.  This is because the information is exclusively held by the firm, claims are self-serving, and often the predicted efficiencies do not materialize.  Lastly, there is no evidence that the supply chain industry model produces the most efficient results.
 
In any event, the main drivers of efficiency are competition and innovation by many firms.  A diversified structure spurs such competition and innovation while allocating resources more widely and beneficially.  Thus, a diverse food industry structure serves the public interest best.
 
In livestock agriculture, horizontal concentration was predicted by proponents to result in benefit to the food sector.  Unfortunately, decision makers have long ignored competition problems arising from concentration.  To the astonishment of many, concentration proponents claimed that three firms in a sector truly results in vigorous competition.  We see today that producers and consumers did not benefit.  The processors benefited. 
 
Captive supply is the recent destructive trend.  Now there are not only fewer bidders, but the remaining bidders are much more passive because they have distributed supply through non-price means: forward contracts, production contracts, marketing agreements and packer ownership.  This gives packers more control over inventory but transforms them into passive bidders that can procure the balance of their supply through conservative bidding.  Spot market transactions are priced lower, are lower in volume, and the thin market increases the risk of manipulation.
 
Our analysis will show that the known facts, analyzed through proper economic models, prove the common sense conclusion that captive supply harms price. 
 
We will hear from some, in this hearing, whom the current system is benefiting.  It is natural that they will try to protect the preferential position they hold, despite the harm caused to others.  The packers who are enjoying record profits do not want to share the benefits properly with the rest of the system should the Secretary decide to increase competition in the marketplace.  Those feedlots which enjoy preferential benefits from marketing agreements do not want to bite the packers’ hand that feeds them.  Further, those representing the packers and the preferred feedlots will not give testimony which harms their interests.  The Secretary can take these factors into account when weighing the credibility of the testimony. 
 
This written testimony is submitted in three parts.  Part One presents the written questions which the USDA will orally present to each hearing witness followed by OCM’s answers to those questions.  Part Two is a full and considered presentation which will show that the law, the facts and the expert opinions show that the Secretary should propound the rule submitted by the Western Organization of Resource Councils (WORC) and that he can do so without fear of losing an administrative appeal. 
 
Part Three advances a rationale for propounding a carefully considered rule to respond to the problem of price discrimination in the agricultural marketplace.  Price discrimination results in a misallocation of resources throughout the production sector.  It increases the pressure on those producers who are receiving market bids in the lower range of the spectrum to leave agriculture.  If price discrimination is allowed to continue, there will always be favored producers and non-favored producers.  The latter subset of producers are more likely to be forced out of production agriculture and the overall attrition rate will continue at an increased speed.
 
In summary, 85% of the respondents in the 2000 Iowa Farm and Rural Life Poll stated that it is problematic to allow so few food companies to control so much of the food system.  This is contrary to the position of the few, powerful voices that advocate a small number of partially or fully integrated supply chains. 

Part One:  OCM’s Response to Questions Submitted by the Secretary
 
1.      What evidence or information do you have that demonstrates that forward contracting or packer ownership of livestock manipulates, controls prices or has other anti-competitive effects, or is likely to do so in the future?  Would the prohibition of certain types of captive supply or of packer ownership of livestock effectively limit packer market power to affect market price?  What other consequences would result from such a prohibition?[2]
 
(a)  Studies unanimously show that there is always a correlation between higher captive supplies and lower prices.  As to causation, well accepted economic models reveal that the most likely explanation is that captive supplies actually cause lower prices.  These models include auction theory and experimental economics.  Further, captive supplies give rise to thin spot markets which are more subject to manipulation or control by the few, powerful packers.  Additionally, the portion of livestock which sets the price each day is less than the full volume of spot livestock reported because many cattle and hogs receive only one bid, not competitive, multiple bids.  Lastly, from a futures market perspective, every piece of information received by floor traders due to captive supply is negative as to price.  Thus, futures prices are bid lower.   
 
(b)  The prohibition of certain types of captive supplies would limit packer market power in the following ways.  First, all packers would have to bid aggressively for cattle in the marketplace.  Basic economic theory is clear that if there is even one of the few packers which becomes a passive bidder, prices will suffer.  With the current system, all packers are often passive bidders.  Second, transforming the currently thin market which results in price discovery into a broad and deep market will lessen packer ability to manipulate or control prices and be more reflective of true supply and demand.
 
(c)  If captive supplies are required to be openly and publicly bid upon rather than traded through secret agreements, all benefits worthy of public policy consideration will be preserved.  Risk management, value-based procurement, and identity preservation are not harmed.  There is no public policy argument in favor of packers owning livestock.  This form of captive supply should be banned.  Packers can recoup their costs through a divestiture sale transaction and focus upon profits elsewhere.
 
2.   What, if any, further regulatory actions should be considered by USDA under the P&S Act to reflect structural changes in the livestock sector?[3]
 
A rule outlawing price discrimination should be promulgated.  Price discrimination is a tremendous problem for farmers and ranchers.  There is an overwhelming disparity in prices paid among producers for like quality livestock.  For example, in hogs the spread is often fifteen dollars per carcass hundredweight between the low and high ends for 49-50% lean animals.  In cattle, we know that marketing agreement cattle receive higher prices than spot market cattle of like grade and quality.
 
The price discrimination is occurring for reasons that violate public policy with the result of forcing farmers and ranchers out of business.  The Secretary should define public policy as to unjust pricing differences in setting substantive and procedural rules.  The substantive rules should disallow all discrimination in prices except for the common sense reasons of grade, quality, special production methods, transportation and time of delivery.  Other reasons for price differentials, such as keeping a plant running at full capacity, should be disallowed as violative of public policy.
 
The procedural rules should address evidentiary burden shifting in enforcement cases for public and private plaintiffs.  Such a provision should state that a plaintiff can prove a prima facie case with a showing that a packer paid different prices for animals of like grade and quality on a given day.  The packer can then defend by showing that the reason for the price discrimination falls within one of the predetermined categories stated above.  If the packer puts on no evidence, the plaintiff wins.  If the packer falls within one of these “safe harbors”, it must also show that the price differential was cost justified. 
 
Further, OCM supports rules under consideration for packer record keeping and contracting.  OCM looks forward to commenting on these rules in the future to help insure that they are responsive to producer needs.
 
3.   There are two sides to the argument on consolidation and concentration in the marketplace.  What evidence do you have to support a contention that greater efficiencies result from consolidation in the marketplace?  What evidence do you have to support a contention that consolidation or concentration result in a decline of competition in the marketplace?
 
(a)  First, efficiencies are irrelevant to market manipulation.  If a packer is intentionally or unintentionally manipulating the market, there is no law that considers efficiency a defense. 
 
Second, efficiencies are difficult to prove.  Efficiency is “probably the most confusing word in economics” and efficiency measures are of “severely limited usefulness.”[4]  The information is solely in the hands of the packer and protected as proprietary information.  Public information is incomplete and subject to serious dispute.  Note that the merger guidelines for the Department of Justice treat efficiency claims with a critical eye.  Such claims must be substantiated, there must be confidence that they will materialize, and they are usually not admitted as evidence in an antitrust case due to relevance problems.  The Secretary should be similarly critical of such claims.
 
Third, there is no evidence indicating that benefits from alleged efficiencies are passed on to producers or consumers.  When hogs traded at eight to ten dollars per hundred weight, consumer prices did not respond.  The recent drop in cattle prices has not been transmitted to the consumer.  Those standing between the farmer and consumer receive the benefits.  A competitive marketplace is more likely to drive efficiency, allocate resources properly and reflect true supply and demand. 
 
Fourth, it is disingenuous to claim that there is only one road to efficiency.  There are many ways to structure an industry.  There is no proof that one structure is appreciably more efficient than other structures.  Full competition by many firms has driven efficiency very hard in other contexts, most notably the agricultural production sector.  Thus, other public policy considerations should control.
 
(b)  The evidence that consolidation or concentration result in a decline of competition in the marketplace is discussed in response to question 1 above.  Further, Heffernan (The Influence of the Big Three: ADM, Cargill and ConAgra, 1999) presents an added theory.  That theory is that economic power comes from “exit power.”  In a relationship between two or more individuals, groups, or organizations, the party that has the least to lose from ending the relationship has the most power in the relationship.  Since meat packers have many choices for procurement and farmers have three to four choices (or one in many cases), the packer has far more exit power than the farmer.  If we take one packer out of the buying, either due to captive supplies, closure or merger, established economic theories predict a lessening of competition.  These predictions correlate with farm prices and the declining farm share of the food dollar which we see today.
 
National policy has focused on the “bigger is better” trend for decades.  This policy has resulted in agriculture being nearly the only sector which is impoverished in this booming economy.  Unfortunately, those supporting the consolidation policies of the past have not admitted failure and people still listen to them.
 
4.   What are the positive and negative effects of the various marketing arrangements – i.e., forward contracts, marketing agreements, packer feeding – on maintaining and sustaining competitive markets?  Please explain how market effect, particularly with reference to price discovery and transparency, support your view.
 
The positive effects of captive supply include risk management for the select few who have such preferential agreements.  Risk management will not be harmed by the adoption of the WORC rule.  Further, there are many risk management options available other than market distorting procurement mechanisms. 
 
However, captive supply as risk management ironically eviscerates use of the futures markets as a risk management tool.  The written testimony of commodity broker Luke Schwieterman (recently submitted for the written record) shows that captive supplies cause cash price fluctuations that result in wild basis fluctuations.  According to Schweiterman, the price fluctuation eliminates the ability to predict the basis, as was formerly the case.  Without a minimally predictable basis, proper hedging cannot occur.  Thus, any risk management benefits by the captive supply feedlots ruins the futures market as a risk management tool for a large portion of non-speculative market participants.
 
Other negative effects of captive supply are lower prices due to increased passivity in packer buying, and an increased likelihood of market manipulation, whether intentional or not.  No one argues that thin markets are good.  No one argues that thin markets produce more and better information.  A tremendous portion of procurement is internalized and the information is not publicly disclosed. 
 
Further negative effects are price discrimination (between marketing agreement cattle and cash cattle for like quality), the lack of pricing information for both cash and futures market participants, and reduced ability to hedge.  See also answer to question 1.
 
5.   Is there any evidence demonstrating the link between the degree of openness and competition in livestock markets and the economic sustainability of rural communities?
 
Lack of competition for livestock means lower prices.  Captive supply, as shown above, means lower prices and price discrimination.  Lower prices and price discrimination results in farmers leaving agriculture.  Fewer farmers in rural communities mean less customers for mainstreet businesses in small towns.  The recent 2000 Iowa Farm and Rural Life poll conducted by Iowa State University showed that at 70 to 80% of farmers do business at local feed stores, supermarkets and other businesses. 
 
Further, rural sociological and anthropological studies which have studied the issue find that when a large number of smaller scale, closely held farms which provide labor, management and capital are replaced by large-scale farms characterized by absentee ownership, rural communities are significantly harmed economically and socially.  Every time a family farm fails, it is a significant tear in the rural fabric.  A large number of “tears” is very destructive.
 
A key component to the captive supply paradigm in poultry, hogs, and to a lesser degree cattle, is that one firm owns a very large number of animals and pays others on a piecemeal type basis to care for the animals.  This system replaces the independent farmers that owned the livestock and reaped the profits from the sale of the livestock.  Even today these farms spend most of that money near the farm, providing the economic foundation of rural communities.  In contrast, vertically integrated operations are much less likely to support local businesses.[5]
 
Recently the Kerr Center released a case study on vertical integration and industrial swine production in Texas County, Oklahoma.[6]  The study provides a good example of what may happen to rural communities as competitive livestock markets disappear under the shadow of captive supplies.  The study points out vertically integrated mega hog farms that replace the independent hog farms “[n]ot only . . . fail to deliver high paying, quality jobs that lend stability to the community, they export the profits out of the community.”[7]  Most, if not all, of the residual profits from the production of hogs now flow out of the community to the stockholders of the corporation, decreasing the income of the rural community.
 
Thu and Durenberger in an introduction to a book examining the relation of industrialized hog production note the following consequences of increased vertical integration:
 
Ownership, management, and labor become separated both economically and socially.  In one form, producers contract with large companies or corporations to produce hogs.  In these “risk-sharing” ventures, the farmer produces hogs owned by someone else following a standardized production protocol specified by the contractor.  In such a system, wealth and profits are extracted from local economic systems which, even where standards of living increase, become increasingly dependent on control from outside systems.[8]
 
Very few rural communities have transitioned successfully away from agriculture.  This is because production agriculture is a diverse, atomistic structure spreading dollars widely and keeping them in the community.  No one argues that any other industry distributes dollars among rural areas as effectively.
 

References for Question 5:
 
Goldschmidt, Walter, As You Sow: How Industrialized Farming is Changing the American Way of Life. New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1947.
 
Miner, Horace, Culture and Agriculture: An Anthropological Study of a Corn Belt County, Ann Arbor, Michigan: U of Michigan Press, 1949.
 
Office of Technology Assessment, Technology, Public Policy, and the Changing Stucture of American Agriculture, Washington, D.C., U.S. Congress, 1986.
 
Kendall Thu, Editor, Understanding the Impacts of Large-Scale Swine Production. Iowa City, Iowa: The University of Iowa, 1986.
 
USDA-EPA, Draft National Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations. September
11. Washington, D.C., 1986.
 
Salamon, Sonya A., The View from Anthropology: Discussion of Castle’s Conceptual Framework. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 80(3):637-639, 1998.
 
Part Two:  OCM Analysis of Proposed Rule on Captive Supply Practices
 
I.             Introduction
 
This analysis by the Organization for Competitive Markets will show that the known facts about captive supplies coupled with established economic theory show that the Secretary should propound the rule submitted by the Western Organization of Resource Councils (WORC) in order to protect and increase competition in the agricultural marketplace.  The WORC rule would require captive supplies to be subjected to an open, public bidding process.  This analysis further shows that the Secretary a choice to adopt the WORC rule would not be reversed in an administrative appeal.
 
II.            The Secretary Possesses  the Authority to Promulgate Rules Limiting Captive Supply and Price Discrimination under the Packers and Stockyards Act.
 
A.  Congress delegated unsurpassed legislative-style rulemaking ability to the Secretary under the Packers & Stockyards Act.
 
The nature of the Congressional delegation of authority under the Packers & Stockyards Act (P&S Act) is the broadest possible pursuant to the Constitution.  This rulemaking authority is quasi-legislative and leaves wide latitude for policy choices.  When passing the P&S Act, Congress purposely used broad language with the intention that the Secretary exercise “complete inquisitorial, visitorial, supervisory, and regulatory power over the packer, stockyards, and all activities connected therewith.”[9]  Congress used broad language in the Act so that the Secretary could adjust enforcement to industry change.[10]  For instance, the Act does not expressly allow or prohibit closed contracts or price discrimination.  The Act charged the Secretary with deciding whether these types of activities harm independent livestock producers. 
 
Section 407 of the P&S Act grants the Secretary the express authority to promulgate regulations:  “The Secretary may make such rules, regulations and orders as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act . . . .”[11]   This is the broadest grant of policy making power to an agency that the U.S. Constitution allows.  When an agency is charged with enforcing such a statute, the Supreme Court requires that reviewing courts allow great deference to the agency’s decision:
 
      If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.  Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute.[12]
 
The question then is whether a decision by the Secretary to promulgate rules regulating captive supply is arbitrary.[13]  “An agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency fails to demonstrate in the record that it has examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its actions.”[14]  Or, as the Supreme Court has stated, an agency’s decision is arbitrary where there is no “rational connection between the facts found and choice made.”[15] 
 
B.  Facts found by the Secretary will not be second guessed, especially where, as here, such facts are general and legislative rather than specific and adjudicative.
 
Just as questions of law are reviewed under the arbitrary standard, so are findings of fact.[16]  The Secretary has tremendous discretion as to which facts he will accept and which facts he will not accept.  The nature of these facts are not specific or adjudicative facts, but rather are general or legislative facts.[17]  This is a significant distinction between factfinding in rulemaking as versus enforcement.  Thus, the Secretary’s primacy in factfinding is incredibly difficult for a court to question or overturn.
 
The Grain Inspection, Packers & Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) and the Office of General Counsel (USDA) position as to the standard by which reviewing courts scrutinize regulations promulgated under the P&S Act is that “[I]f a reasonable person who reviewed the evidence would find that the Act was likely to be violated if the complained of activity continued, then the Secretary could prohibit the activity through the regulatory process.”[18]  The reasonableness standard is also known as the ‘substantial evidence standard’.[19]  Our analysis respectfully disagrees with this uncited assertion.  The law states that the ‘arbitrariness’ standard applies in this situation and provides the Secretary with greater discretion. 
 
The two standards differ in that “[c]ourts have recognized that the substantial evidence [reasonableness] standard requires greater judicial scrutiny of an agency decision then does the arbitrariness standard.”[20]  The reasonableness standard is used in formal adjudication, such as when a circuit court reviews the agency’s decision in an administrative action against a particular person; the more lenient ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is used when a court reviews an informal rulemaking, which the WORC Petition seeks.[21]  This difference is significant because the applicable “arbitrariness” standard provides the Secretary with greater authority in issuing regulations that affect livestock markets.[22]
 
Additionally, judicial review in an adjudicative context, such as the IBP Beef Marketing Group case, is backward looking at past facts.  Conversely, rulemaking is forward looking and inherently speculative and predictive.  This forward looking perspective allows far less ability for a court to second guess the Secretary’s finding of facts, determination of policies and acceptance of expert theories in the context of court review.
 
C.                                   The Secretary has tremendous authority to determine which technical evidence and expert opinions he will accept in the rulemaking process.
 
When reviewing rules that require technical expertise issued under a statute where an agency is charged with preventing harm, the D.C. Circuit provides great deference.  In the case of a precautionary-style statute, courts do not require direct causation.  “[W]here, as here, the statute is ‘precautionary’ in nature, the evidence ‘uncertain or conflicting’ and the ‘regulations designed to protect the public health,’ the court ‘will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect.’”[23]  The P&S Act is a precautionary statute designed to prevent “potential injury by stopping unlawful practices in their incipiency” and “proof of a particular injury is not required.”[24]
 
Further, the agency may utilize its own expertise, or those of other experts it chooses to credit, to fill in gaps in direct evidence.  “The Administrator may apply his expertise to draw conclusions from suspected, but not completely substantiated, relationships between facts, from trends among facts, from theoretical projections from imperfect data, from probative preliminary data not yet certifiable as ‘fact,’ and the like.”[25]
 
The D.C. Circuit, which would review any challenge to a rule the Secretary may issue, echoed this approach in a case dealing with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s valuation of petroleum shipped on Alaska pipelines.  Here the court recognized that “[w]here the necessary analysis ‘requires a high level of technical expertise, we must defer to the informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies.’”[26]
 
The notion of increased deference to agency decisions relating to technical matters that are within the agency’s expertise also applies to decisions within the USDA.  In Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Glickman,[27] the court reviewed the Secretary’s decision to sell salvage timber.  As to deference and the specter of conflicting expert evidence, the court stated:
 
A deferential approach is “especially appropriate where, as here, the challenged decision implicates substantial expertise.”  Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1568, 1571 (9th Cir. 1993) . . . See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 813-14 (1978) (where the agency’s particular technical expertise is involved, the court must be particularly zealous in guarding the agency’s discretion).  “When specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive.”  Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989).[28]
 
Beyond facts that have been proven, the Secretary may also make policy on issues in which “insufficient data is presently available to make a fully informed factual determination.”[29]  Where research in an area is not yet developed, “the agency necessarily enjoys the broad discretion to attempt to formulate a solution to the best of its ability on the basis of available information.”[30]  A court will uphold a regulation unless the regulation is “so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”[31]
 
Given this extremely deferential standard that courts grant to the Department in this type of technical rulemaking, the Secretary can be assured that a rule limiting captive supply would survive a challenge.  Transforming secret captive supply procurement methods to a true market bidding system is a duty that the Secretary owes farmers and ranchers.
 
III.          The Evidence and Well-Accepted Economic Theory Shows that Captive Supplies Violate the P&S Act.
 
A. Studies are unanimous in finding a negative correlation between captive supplies and prices.
 
Each and every study on the issue of the captive supply/price relationship has found a negative correlation.  The recent Shroeter and Azzam analysis found that the “[a]verage price in the region’s spot market for cattle tends to be relatively low in weeks in which delivery of cattle from non-cash sources are relatively high, other things equal.”[32]  In fact, Schroeter and Azzam conclude that “a robust empirical relationship was found in every case:  The slaughter of cattle procured by non-cash means and contemporaneous spot market prices are negatively related at the regional level.”[33]  The results “when taken at face value, suggest that the impact of non-cash procurement methods on price is reasonably substantial.”[34] 
 
This study echoes numerous others that have considered the relationship between captive supplies and prices.[35]  There is no study which has found otherwise.  Thus, the Secretary must make a finding acknowledging this correlation as there is no substantial evidence to the contrary.
 
B. Reliance on well-accepted economic models show that captive supplies cause lower prices.
 
The difficulty perceived by the Secretary’s staff in considering a rule on captive supply has been an alleged lack of evidence of causation.  Does captive supply cause lower prices, or is there another causative factor?  Well established economic theories, in combination with the known facts, answer the question by concluding that captive supplies are the causative factor.
 
Captive supplies lead to less active bidders in the market, and therefore a lower price.  Schroeter and Azzam recognize this effect on bidding:  “When a packer enters the spot market knowing that a relatively large proportion of its typical slaughter volume is committed, for the near-term future, in the form of already scheduled deliveries of cattle procured by non-cash means, it will usually want to purchase correspondingly fewer spot market cattle.  This can normally be accomplished with relatively conservative bidding.”[36]  Sexton observes that “[e]ven a cursory analysis of the spot market bidding process reveals that it is heavily skewed in favor of the packers, and any forces that diminish a packer’s incentives to bid aggressively for cattle are likely to adversely affect cash prices.”[37]  Because of the concentration disparity, Sexton concludes that it is likely that the conservative bidding described by Schroeter and Azzam will affect prices.[38]
 
Captive supplies effectively remove a bidder from the market for a certain percentage of livestock because the packer no longer needs to actively bid in the open market for the percentage of cattle it has captive.  McLaren discusses the dynamic that adding one more bidder to a market will either increase the price, or at the very least not change the price.[39]  Thus, removing a firm can only lower the price, or possibly not change the price.  As the American Meat Institute and others in the cattle industry admitted in a recent Memorandum filed with a federal district court in Missouri, “[t]he fewer the number of buyers, the more likely it is that the price will go down.”[40]  Captive supplies removes one or more buyers from the open market, and therefore has the effect of manipulating or controlling the market.
 
Further, captive supplies exacerbate the problems inherent in the current bidding process for cattle.[41]  “A bidding process where the same three or four buyers interact repeatedly through time and among many sellers is a process that is tailor made for bidder collusion.”[42]  Factors which evidence the fact that the current bidding process reflects packers’ power to implement a system that is favorable to them include:
 
1. Bidding only occurs in one relatively short time window per week, such as 30 minutes to two hours once per week, in a take-it-or-leave-it format rather than true negotiation;
2. A nonprice, queuing mechanism is used to distribute cattle to buyers, wherein the first bidder has priority in the case of ties; and
3. Whole dollar bidding, rather than fractions of dollars.
 
Each of these factors is likely imposed by the packer side of the market, reflecting packer ability to not bid aggressively.  Conversely stated, such conventions are impossible for sellers to create or impose.  The short bidding window is strange, to say the least, when a packer is killing cattle five to six days per week.  It facilitates “panic selling” by buyers, rather than back and forth price negotiation. 
 
Aggressive bidding is also stifled by the “queuing mechanism” used by buyers.[43]  This queuing mechanism provides that the first bidder receives two advantages:  the first bidder has the priority in the case of tie bids, and the first bidder has the opportunity to revise his bid if someone increases the bid.  “Whole dollar” bidding conventions increase the likelihood of tie bids (assuming the seller receives more than one bid).  The actual facts show that typically all bids on a particular lot are the same. [44]  The dynamic leads to the anticompetitive result that “queuing and not pricing determines who gets the cattle,” according to Dr. Sexton at the University of California, Davis.[45]
 
Captive supplies are an additional, but probably the most important, force that evidences a packer’s diminished incentive to bid aggressively for cash cattle.  Almost all observers recognize that captive supply results in a packer being able to bid more conservatively.  Both auction theory and experimental economics find that when there are three or four buyers, and one becomes a passive bidder, price is depressed.  Captive supply allows at least one, if not all, packers to become more passive bidders.  Thus, the price is likely to be lower due to the less aggressive nature of full bidding in a totally competitive market.  Cattle are distributed to buyers without bidding. [46]
 
Other studies have examined the reason underlying the fact that as captive supplies increase, price decreases.  For instance, Love points out a study that found that as a firm increases the use of captive supply, “aggregate demand in the market is reduced and spot prices in the input market are reduced.”[47]  In other words, captive supplies have the effect of controlling the aggregate demand of a market.
 
The behavioral models discussed above, with the relevant facts established, require the Secretary to adopt a rule to eliminate the harm captive supplies cause to market competition. 
 
C. The unprecedented intertemporal arbitrage theory posited by Schroeter and Azzam to explain how captive supplies might not cause lower prices is implausible.
 
Schroeter and Azzam recognize the robust negative correlation between captive supplies and prices.  Yet they argue against a finding of causation.  Rather, they propose a heretofore unheard of “intuitive model” which hypothesizes an intertemporal arbitrage ability exclusively executed by marketing agreement feedlot managers.[48]  Schroeter and Azzam claim, without factual or theoretical support, that the market participants (participating in marketing agreements) are “undoubtedly quite good forecasters of price.”[49]  They allege that captive supply feedlot managers decide to schedule their cattle to take advantage of a fluctuating market.  The causation related upshot of this theory is that higher spot prices cause more captive supply because feedlot operators dump their marketing agreement cattle to lock in the higher spot prices.  Not only does this theory have no support in the literature, it does not make sense for several reasons.
 
As reviewer Cranfield points out, this “intertemporal argument is weak, as it does not reflect, or even allow for the possibility that those active in the cash market will take advantage of the same profit making opportunities as those using captive supplies.”[50]  Sexton points out that the conceptual flaw in Schroeter and Azzam’s argument is “their failure to consider that participants in the cash market have the same incentives.”[51]  Thus, spot market sellers – many of which price the cattle on the week prior to delivery – would also schedule their cattle to take advantage of higher prices.  This dynamic would offset or overwhelm any potential arbitrage actions of the captive supply sellers.  Thus, higher prices could not cause higher prices.  There are no facts or credible theories allowing the Secretary to conclude otherwise. 
 
Dr. Alan Love points out in his review of the Texas Panhandle analysis at least three other models predict “that vertical integration, or contracting, can have a depressing effect on spot market input price in markets characterized by partial vertical integration.”[52]  Professor DeeVon Bailey has similar reservations.[53]
 
Another major weakness in the Schroeter and Azzam argument is that it lacks “a well-defined model of packerbuying behavior.”[54]  Would the more powerful market participants, the packers, allow this arbitrage to continue thereby increasing their procurement cost?  Doubtful.  Without a model looking at packer behavior, it is impossible to give credibility to a theory that attributes significant arbitrage ability to one sector of the market participants (i.e. exclusively marketing agreement sellers) on the weaker side of the transaction.
 
Thus, the only credible economic models conclude, when the facts are inserted, that captive supplies are highly likely to be the causative factor in depressing price.  This result confirms common sense.  Thus, the Secretary should promulgate the WORC rule.
 
D. Thin markets increase the ability for manipulation.
 
Apart from the issue of causation, increased non-price procurement through captive supplies result in a thin cash market.  The increased likelihood of manipulation or control of this increasingly thin market is reason enough to propound the WORC rule.
 
The overwhelming majority of long term contracts are derived directly or indirectly from the spot market price (because commodities future trading rely significantly on cash market information, forward contracts are derivatively affected by the spot price).  It is uncontested that the existence of captive supplies thins the spot market, thereby increasing the likelihood of manipulation.  Schroeter and Azzam recognized that as the spot market becomes thinner, “spot prices will become increasingly less reflective of the forces of supply and demand.”[55]  They further state that, “[w]hen a packer anticipates an unusually large volume of marketing agreement deliveries in a given week, there is an obvious incentive to try to reduce the formula’s base price so as to reduce the price that will have to be paid for the formula-priced cattle.”[56]
 
Depending on the region, cattle procured through captive supplies vary between 25 to 50%, with some weeks approaching 100%.  Hogs are approaching 75% captive supply. 
 
But the spot market is even thinner than the reported numbers suggest.  OCM has found that many of the cattle and hogs traded in the open market are not subject to competitive bidding.  Producers in areas where there are several packers often receive only one bid either because captive supplies decrease aggressive packer bidding or due to “relationship livestock” where a producer has a relationship with a packer buyer and sends all the animals to that packer without bidding every time.  Further, many producers live in areas where there is only one available packer.  In those areas it is impossible to get more than one bid.
 
There is a significant history in the agricultural and non-agricultural field where thin markets have been manipulated.  The 1996 Mueller and Marion study of the cheese exchange is only one example.
 
To increase aggressive bidding on all cattle and hogs, and to reduce the likelihood of market manipulation, captive supplies should be traded on the open market with all players having access.  A broader and deeper market such as this will be more reflective of supply and demand factors.
 
E.  Captive supplies limit or eliminate the ability of producers to hedge price risk through the futures markets.
 
The written testimony submitted by Luke Schwieterman, a commodities broker in Western Kansas, presents facts showing that the cash price fluctuations connected with captive supplies in the cattle market make hedging difficult.  Producers have historically hedged price risk through the futures markets.  Proper hedging requires a market which behaves in a somewhat predictable manner with regard to basis.[57]
 
The cash market gyrations associated with captive supplies result in unpredictable basis.  When the basis fluctuates too much, the risk management benefit of hedging is eliminated.  Thus, captive supply further harms market participants by taking away a major method of price protection – hedging inventory in the futuresmarkets.  Thus, captive supplies should be openly traded to add to, rather than subtract from, full market information and proper reflection of true supply and demand factors.
 
F. Captive supplies cause declines in futures market prices.
 
Futures markets are ideally a proper reflection of cash market supply and demand factors.  Les Messinger, in testimony submitted for this hearing, conveys that each and every piece of information derived from market conditions relating to captive supplies has a depressing impact on futures prices.  Messinger has been a live cattle future trader at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange for the past 30 years.
 
From the perspective within the live cattle pit at the CME:
 
“Information is the lifeblood of proper pricing by floor traders.  The result of captive supplies is that the practice drives futures prices down.  Captive supply practices limit information which is necessary for a market to reflect true supply and demand factors.  Further, the little remaining cash market information that traders are able to gather is controlled by the packing industry – rather than other sources – and generally carries a negative bias.”[58]
 
The type of information related to captive supplies which provides significant downward pressure on cattle futures includes:
 
1. Packers have secured enough cattle under their control so that the perception of the futures industry is that they will rarely ever have to bid higher to buy cattle.
2. No realistic cash market exists during the trading week until Thursday or Friday when packers bid for the remainder of their kill, thereby depressing futures prices.
3. When bidding does occur on the cash market, it usually lasts only for about an hour.[59]
 
Messinger adds that : “The general consensus among those of us who process market information in the CME live cattle pit is that packers control the cash markets through the use of captive supplies.  Futures prices are significantly and negatively affected by that perception.  Further perceptions are that prices will only rally as far as packers will allow them to go before taking action to stop them through manipulating captive supply deliveries.  Because the futures market lives on information, these perceptions on information become reality in that they are reflected in the price of live cattle contracts.”[60]
 
Messinger closing remarks strongly recommend that captive supplies be ended or subjected to open, public bidding.
 
“It is my recommendation that the Secretary end captive supply practices unless long term agreements aretransformed into an open bidding process which produces a larger volume of information that is less likely to be controlled by the packers.  When there is more information that is less under the control of one side of the transaction, the bias is not skewed in one direction.”
 
This evidence is difficult for an economic study to rebut.  As a result, the WORC rule should be promulgated.
 
IV.       Industry Claims of Efficiency or Other Benefits are Unrelated to the P&S Act
 
A. If the Secretary concludes that captive supplies has the effect of controlling or manipulating the market, or that they are unfair, efficiency arguments are not applicable.
 
It is to be expected that the packing industry will argue strenuously to preserve a non-price system of procurement which benefits them at the expense of others.  The Secretary can take this motivation into account when determining which claims to accept or reject.
 
Packers often argue, for example, that the use of captive supplies provides them certain positive results, such as the packer being able to fully utilize its capacity.  Yet the P&S Act is not designed to maximize packer profits.  It is designed to prevent certain packer practices which are unfair or have the effect of manipulating or controlling prices.  Under section 202(e), if a packer practice has the effect of manipulating or controlling the market, the practice violates the Act.  There is no law that includes the rule of reason analysis in Section 202(e).  Thus, a practice that has the effect of manipulating or controlling prices is a per se violation of the Act. 
 
Because the Secretary has both correlation and causation, as explained above, with regard to the effect of captive supplies on price, section 202(e) grants the Secretary authority to promulgate the WORC rule.  Thus, no rule of reason style justifications apply.  Packer efficiency is irrelevant.  The reasons for feedlot operators entering into agreements is not a consideration.  Food safety and trace back ability are similarly irrelevant. 
 
Though there is a lack of consensus as to whether the rule of reason is applicable at all to the P&S Act, the Seventh Circuit, a non-controlling authority, has said the terms unfair, unjust, undue and unreasonable do require the Secretary to utilize the rule of reason analysis under sections 202(a) and (b).[61]  Assuming, without conceding, that the rule of reason is relevant under sections 202(a) and (b), the Secretary is not bound to import the full contours of antitrust law defenses into the P&S Act. 
 
The Secretary, pursuant to his quasi-legislative rulemaking ability, can determine the weight and priority he attributes to certain justifications.  For example, efficiency claims are of little relevance, and almost never proven, under antitrust law.  There is no reason to assign higher priority here.  Under the rule of reason analysis, there is no law which requires food safety and trace back ability to be considerations.  Further, issues of full capacity at packing plants should be given little priority. 
 
Conversely, the Secretary can assign high priority to an effect of lowering prices.  He can also give high priority to the risk of market manipulation.  If there are relevant justifications determined by non-agricultural antitrust law, the Secretary can choose to give them less weight than courts have done in the past.  It would be difficult for a reviewing court to challenge those policy judgments.
 
B. Even if there are benefits to partial integration, those benefits are unaffected by the WORC rule.
 
The meat industry has long argued that benefits exist to justify captive supplies.  Assuming, without conceding, that these benefits exists, the WORC petition does not eliminate them.  Packers would still have the ability to contract for future deliveries.  The WORC Rule simply demands that the contracts be available in an open market.  Similarly, there is no evidence that the rule would hinder packers’ ability to maintain their plant capacities, undertake value-based pricing, or achieve identity preservation.  The rule would merely address the most negative aspects of captive supplies:  the depressing effect that the use of captive supplies has on the price and the increasingly thin open market which is more subject to manipulation.
 
A recent position paper by economists funded by the American Meat Institute (Marvin Hayenga, Ted Schroeder, John Lawrence, Dermot Hayes, Tomislav Vukina, Clement Ward and Wayne Purcell) lists reasons why packers prefer to enter into contracts.  The first of these is reduced costs, primarily because packers are better able to run at nearer to full capacity.[62]  The AMI paper concludes that “[s]uch sizeable cost savings serve as a major motivation for beef packers to develop non-price means such as contracts and marketing agreements to better coordinate cattle flows into beef packing plants.”[63]  Does this mean that packers would like to maintain an adequate supply by using mechanisms that do not require them to increase the price to increase supply?  There are no studies which show that packers are unable to fill their plants without non-price procurement.  Additionally, P&S Act was not passed to help packers run at full capacity with confidence.
 
In any event, the WORC rule would not hinder the packers’ ability to contract.  If packers want to line up a portion of their supply months in advance, they may do so.  But they must offer that contract on an open market and set a fixed base price.  The claimed “sizeable cost savings” can then be partially bid back into the cattle.  The increased packer profit should not come from captive supplies’ effect of manipulating or controlling the price.
 
The AMI study also cites risk management as one of the reasons packers and producers prefer to contract.[64]  Packers reduce the risk of running the plant at less than optimal capacity.  This argument is the same as the reduced cost argument. 
 
The AMI paper concludes that producers who choose to contract do so to reduce the risk of not being able to market their cattle at the most optimal time.  The factual basis for this claim is highly suspect.  Yet, the WORC rule would allow this risk management to continue.  Producers who wish to contract cattle for future delivery may do so under the WORC Rule.  The regulation would merely require that the contract be available on the open market and that the packer would have to set the base price of the cattle in the contract. 
 
As Cranfield states:  “If marketing agreement cattle are used to manage risk, with the unintended effect of lowering spot market prices, then it would seem prudent for any regulatory agency to recognize the role of risk management when making policy decisions. . . .  [The WORC Petition] has the benefit of allowing regional captive supply markets to evolve in a manner that reflects regional supply and demand conditions, and allows for more transparent pricing mechanisms to be used.”[65]
 
Citing value-based pricing as another reason for contracting,[66] the AMI paper somehow assumes that carcass merit pricing may only occur in secretly negotiated contracts.  It notes a number of analysts that have argued that the cattle industry must improve information flow to provide incentives for what customers demand.  Value based pricing is not prohibited under the WORC rule.  In fact, value-based pricing occurs in the spot market.  Cattle can be sold on a grid or through other mechanisms using a base price and quality premiums.  Nothing prevents the openly traded contracts from contemplating grade or other quality characteristics.
 
Finally, the AMI paper cites the need for identity preservation for food safety reasons so that the consumer knows that the meat is raised GMO free or has the ability to trace back to the source.  Nothing in the WORC rule would discourage packers from tracking the meat from the feedlot to the grocery store shelf.  If packers wish to acquire livestock that were raised a certain way, then they can make that part of the restriction of the contract when it is offered to the public.  Identity preservation is a mere record-keeping function unconnected with captive supply.  Low-tech approaches such as affidavits and on-site feedlot inspections are available.  In fact, the openly bid contracts can include such specifications.  High-tech methods of trace back such as computer chip implants could also be used.  Captive supply is not crucial to this issue. 
 
V.           Conclusion
 

Thus, the evidence clearly shows that the marketplace and farmers would be well served if captive supplies in hogs and cattle were required to be traded in an open bid system with a firm base price attached.  A decision to promulgate the WORC rule, would be, in practice, immune from reversal if it is challenged in an administrative appeal.  OCM requests, in the strongest possible terms, that the Secretary do so.
Part Three: OCM Analysis on Proposed Price Discrimination Regulations
 
A. The Secretary should promulgate a rule on price discrimination in the hog and cattle markets.
 
Beyond the effect of captive supplies on the market, one of the practices that harms independent farmers the most is the unjust discrimination suffered in prices.  Small to mid-size producers who lack bargaining power receive less favorable terms than larger farmers.  In many instances, this price discrimination occurs for no justifiable reason.  All farms are harmed by the manipulation of the market by the packers’ use of captive supplies.  Small farmers are doubly wounded because of unjust price discrimination.
 
The analysis by Schroeter and Azzam of data collected by GIPSA concerning cattle purchases in the Texas Panhandle found that cattle purchased on the spot market received less than those with the same quality procured through captive supply.[67]  This finding comports with previous studies that examined the relationship between spot market prices and prices for livestock purchased under a captive arrangement.[68] 
           
Packers will argue that paying large producers more per head is justified because of some type ofefficiency.  As the Department of Justice (DoJ) realizes, these efficiency arguments can sometimes be very speculative.  GIPSA should adopt DoJ’s attitude toward efficiencies as stated in DoJ’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines:
 
Efficiencies are difficult to verify and quantify, in part because much of the information relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging firms. Moreover, efficiencies projected reasonably and in good faith by the merging firms may not be realized. Therefore, the merging firms must substantiate efficiency claims so that the Agency can verify by reasonable means the likelihood and magnitude of each asserted efficiency, how and when each would be achieved (and any costs of doing so), how each would enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, and why each would be merger-specific. Efficiency claims will not be considered if they are vague or speculative or otherwise cannot be verified by reasonable means.[69]
 
As discussed earlier, when the Secretary finds that a practice is likely to injure competition, the practice violates the P&S Act.  Discriminating against smaller farmers for such reasons as efficiency that cannot be articulated or quantified injures the ability of those farmers to compete. 
 
This price discrimination makes it impossible for many farmers to survive.  A focus on packing plant efficiency over fairness in pricing is in direct opposition to the spirit of the P&S Act.  As the legislative history indicates, the Act is intended to “permit the meat producer to exist” and “to make the business for the producer more profitable.”[70]  With these goals in mind, factors beyond efficiencies must also be examined to truly understand the nature of price discrimination.  Because Congress intended the P&S Act to be “a most far-reaching measure” that extended “farther than any previous law in the regulation of private business,”[71] the Secretary should consider the full scope of harmful effects of price discrimination. 
 
For instance, small farmers operate in a market environment in which they have relatively little bargaining power.[72]  As a recent commentator, Jon Lauck, notes, “Recent jurisprudence has given greater attention to the relative strength of firms in adjacent markets.  The recognition of bargaining power disparities between buyers and sellers could signal greater attention to the problem of disorganized farmers selling into concentrated markets occupied by powerful firms.”[73]  This recognition of the disparities in bargaining power has caused some courts to look at some vertically aligned markets in a different light.[74]  An examination of these cases brings Lauck to conclude:
 
In tandem with judicial recognition of the importance of monopsony power, the buyer-power defense creates a rationale for scrutinizing the power of buyers relative to sellers.  Thousands of farmers, for example, are hard-pressed to muster the market power necessary to check the powerful food companies who buy their products.  Farmer marketing is characteristically disorganized and “fragmented,” similar to the descriptions [in caselaw].[75]
 
This concept of buyer-power is even more grave in the case of smaller sellers.  Arguably, some of the largest feedlots or hog companies have the power to sit across the table from the big meatpackers and negotiate with more power through high volume.  Small producers, however, are often relegated to take-it-or-leave-it offers that are less favorable than those offered to large producers.[76]  In considering rules to prohibit unjust price discrimination, the Secretary should consider this disparity in bargaining power.
 
Courts in recent years have also recognized the anticompetitive effects of information disparities in markets.[77]  Most significantly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services expanded the notion of market power to include the relevant costs and difficulties for certain types of firms to gather information.[78]  “Kodak suggests that market power may be found wherever ignorant buyers can be exploited through individualized bargaining.”[79] 
 
As the Secretary considers whether to promulgate rules that regulate the livestock industry, especially as to price discrimination, he should also consider the great information disadvantage that small farmers suffer as opposed to packing firms and large sellers.  “When the prices paid for a commodity vary widely, indicating that some sellers did not find the highest bidders in the market, information problems are in evidence.”[80] 
 
A quick look at the current voluntarily reported prices in the hog market reveals a gaping disparity.  Reported prices generally reveal price differences of between 20 and 25% of the total price. For instance, as I write this testimony on September 6th, the prices per hundred pounds of carcass for a hog that is 49-50% lean on the AMS Western Cornbelt closing report range from $43.25 to $58.10.  This means that hogs of the same quality, purchased on the same day, range nearly $15 cwt.  Packers are able to segregate the sellers who do not have the access or means to compile pertinent market information and reduce the price.  This lack of information is not a justifiable reason to discriminate in pricing.
 
Though recent efforts by Congress and the USDA may help to level the disparities of information, because this wild range in prices continues even though publicly reported, the problem will likely remain.  Thus, rules should be propounded to prevent discrimination and protect all producers from pricing which does not reflect the full value for their product in the marketplace.
 
B. A rational price discrimination rule should define allowable reasons for discrimination and disallow all others as violative of public policy.
 
GIPSA should promulgate rules that define the terms “undue preference” and “unjust discrimination.”  Because the terms remain undefined, there is a lack of certainty in the marketplace.  Ad hoc, I-know-it-when-I-see-it enforcement is a poor substitute for predictability and rational enforcement.  The best way to accomplish this goal is to address: (1) the type of premiums allowed, (2) the level of the premiums, and (3) who the premiums are offered to. 
 
As to the type of premiums, they should be limited to quality differences, time-of-delivery differences, quantifiable differences in procurement and handling, and production methods which enhance product value.  These allowable premiums would come into play as allowable defenses in a litigation context after the Secretary/plaintiff put on his case-in-chief.  Thus, the packer would have to prove that it discriminated for a lawful reason.  Any other premiums, such as cost savings from running plants at full capacity, or the size of the producer, should not be allowed because such reasons for discrimination are not contemplated in the P&S Act’s policy to protect livestock sellers.
 
As to the level of premiums, they must be based on the value of the service or condition being paid for through the premium.  For example, if a premium based upon delivery time is allowable, the level of that premium could not be $30/cwt on hogs because that amount would be far greater than its real value. 
 
Additionally, as to whom the premium is offered, a meat packer could not merely offer that premium to a chosen few producers while withholding it from other producers who qualify.  If a producer qualifies for a premium that others receive, he/she should receive it.  A new regulation must address this potential loophole as well.
 
It is amazing that no Secretary has defined “undue preference” and “unjust discrimination” through a rule at any time in the eighty year history of the P&S Act.  This administration should correct this error.
 
C. An evidentiary burden shifting provision should also be included in a price discrimination rule.
 
Currently, the lack of clarity as to the evidentiary burden shifting rules, in addition to the lack of definition of undue or unjust, means that a public or private plaintiff has difficulty proving a case under sections 202(a) and (b).  What is a justifiable reason for discrimination?  Must the plaintiff disprove all potential justifications that the defendant may conjure?  What is a prima facie case under the P&S Act in an enforcement proceeding or in private litigation?
 
The Secretary should promulgate a rule defining a prima facie case which a public or private plaintiff must show to prove a violation of the P&S Act.  This technique is common in other federal laws, such as employment discrimination law.  It would operate in a court proceeding as follows.  Initially, the Secretary would be required to prove that one producer, for example, was paid less than another producer for similar livestock. 
 
Then the burden is shifted to the packer to prove a valid reason for that difference in payment.  The packers defense would be limited by the reasons delineated above provided that they were cost justified.  If the packer puts on no evidence, the Secretary or private plaintiff wins.  If the packer effectively shoulders its burden, then the Secretary/plaintiff has an opportunity to respond.
 
Thus, the Secretary should exercise his authority to prevent this harm in the marketplace through promulgating the type of price discrimination rule presented above.————————————————————————

[1] Morrison-Paul, Katherine J., Productivity and Efficiency in the U.S. Food System (April 2000) (quoting Pope (1987) and Ladd (1987)).
[2] This question is answered fully in OCM’s full written analysis of the WORC rule (Written Testimony, Part One, Section III) below.
[3] This question is answered more fully in OCM’s analysis of a proposed price discrimination rule (Written Testimony, Part 3). 
[4] Morrison-Paul, supra, note 1.
[5] See Rod Smith, Acquisitions Give Smithfield Pronounced Role in U.S., World, Feedstuffs, September 4, 2000, at 6, 17 (noting that Smithfield’s acquisition of Carroll’s and Murphy will save the largest hog producer and processor in transportation and purchasing costs).
[6] North Central Regional Center for Rural Development, Bringing Home the Bacon?:  The Myth of the Role of Corporate Hog Farming in America.
[7] Id. at ES-5.
[8] Kendall M. Thu and E. Paul Durrenberger, Pigs, Profits, and Rural Communities 7 (1998).
[9] House Report No. 77, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1921).
[10] 61 Cong. Rec. 1887 (1921).  Congressman Anderson noted that “the provisions of this legislation as to the packers must be more or less elastic in order that they may keep pace with the state and development of the industry.”
[11] 7 U.S.C. §228(a). 
[12] Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
[13] See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A).
[14] Rocky Mt. Helicopters, Inc. v. FAA, 975 F.2d 736, 737 (10th Cir. 1992).
[15] Bowman Transp, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (1974).
[16] Charles L. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice 125 (1997) (“Generally, factfinding in rulemaking is reviewed under the arbitrariness test.”).
[17] Id.
[18] GIPSA, Review of Western Organization of Resource Councils Petition for Rulemaking 16 (August 29, 1997) (hereinafter GIPSA Review). Note that although the Secretary is given more discretion than the reasonableness, even if the reasonableness standard applies, the Secretary would have the discretion to promulgate a rule limiting captive supplies.  If a reasonable person was told that study after study indicated that as captive supplies increase, price decreases, that person would conclude that the Secretary has the authority, if not the duty, to regulate these captive supplies.  This is especially true given that one of  the Secretary’s main tasks under the P&S Act is to “safeguard farmers and ranchers against receiving less than true market value of their livestock.”  Bosma v. USDA, 754 F.2d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing H. Rep. No. 1048, 85th Cong. 2d Session, reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5212, 5213).
[19] Koch, supra note 12, at § 10.1[3] (2nd ed.) (1997) (“Between de novo review and unreviewability are two word formulas requiring either reasonableness (usually expressed by the term ‘substantial evidence’) or arbitrariness review.”).
[20] Id. (citing e.g.  National Audobon Soc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 46 F.3d 1437, 1445 (9th Cir. 1993); AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 970 (11th Cir. 1992)).
[21] Koch, supra note 12, at §10.3.
[22] As to policy making, again the agency enjoys great latitude:  “Agencies have substantial authority in the legitimate exercise of policymaking and courts should limit their review to ensuring that the policymaking authority exists under the statute and that the agency took care in the exercising of that discretion.  Resolution of policy questions in rulemaking must be subjected to only limited review.”  Id. at §11.24 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845).
[23] American Mining Congress v. U.S. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (considering regulations issued under the Clean Air Act and quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. (en banc), cert denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976)).
[24] Daniels v. United States, 242 F.2d 39, 42 (7th Cir. 1957), cert denied, 354 U.S. 939, reh’g denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957); Bowman v. USDA 363 F.2d 81, 185 (5th Cir. 1966), quoting Daniels.
[25] American Mining Congress, 902 F.2d at 968 (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. (en banc), cert denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976)).
[26] OXY USA, Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 64 F.3d 679, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
[27] 932 F.Supp. 1189 (D. Ariz 1996) (aff’d 100 F.3d 1443).
[28] Id. at 1193.
[29] Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 473-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (considering a rule promulgated by the Department of Labor on standards for exposure to asbestos).
[30] Id. at 474 n.18 (citing Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 811 (1968)).
[31] Hughes River Watershed v. Johnson, 165 F.3d 283, 288 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)).
[32] John R. Schroeter and Azzedine Azzam, Econometric Analysis of Fed Cattle Procurement in the Texas Panhandle 46 (November 1999).
[33] Id. at 6.
[34] Id.
[35] See Mingxia Zhang and Richard J. Sexton, Captive Supplies and the Cash Market Price:  A Spatial Markets Approach 1 (May 5, 1999) (citing other studies that have documented inverse relationship between captive supplies and price); Schroeter and Azzam, supra note 28, at 15.
[36] Schroeter and Azzam, supra note 28, at 7.
[37] Richard J. Sexton, Review of Texas Panhandle Study 4 (March 1999).
[38] Id. at 4.
[39] H. Alan Love, Review of Texas Fed-Cattle Investigation 5 (May 1999).
[40] Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order in Hampton Feedlot, Inc., et al. v. Nixon, (Western District of Missouri, Central Division, 1999).
[41] Not only the bidding process, but market power itself cuts against the seller.  See John A. Cranfield, Review of Texas Panhandle Study 3 (March 2000) (“Results from Schroeter (1988) and other research using market power models (for example, Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990), Koontz, Garcia and Hudson (1993), Koontz and Garcia (1997), among others) suggest that beef packers can exert influence on the price they pay in live cattle markets.”).
[42] Sexton, supra note 33, at 4.
[43] Id. at 4.
[44] Ronald Fescoe, Review of Texas Panhandle Study 6 (May 1999).
[45]  Sexton, supra note 33, at 4.  Yet another example of the skewed bidding process is the convention that bidders only bid in whole dollars.  Id.  This harms sellers because the bidders will bid up to his marginal revenue, but never more.  Therefore, if the marginal revenue is $73.75, the most a packer will bid is $73. 
[46] See generally, Sexton, Richard, Written testimony submitted to USDA-GIPSA for September 21, 2000 hearing.
[47] Love, supra note 35, at 5 (citing Winand Emons, Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration, 14 International Journal of Industrial Organization 465 (1996)).
[48] Schroeter and Azzam, supra note 28, at 8.
[49] Id.
[50] Cranfield, supra note 37 (citing the Review conducted by Richard J. Sexton for GIPSA).
[51] Sexton, supra note 33, at 5.
[52] Love, supra note 35, at 6.
[53] Bailey, DeeVon, Letter to GIPSA dated April 1, 1999.
[54] Cranfield, supra note 37, at 4. 
[55] Schroeter and Azzam, supra note 28, at 10.
[56] Schroeter and Azzam, supra note 28, at 64.
[57] Schweiterman, Luke, Written testimony presented to USDA-GIPSA, September 21, 2000.
[58] Messinger, Les, Written testimony presented to USDA-GIPSA, September 21, 2000.
[59] Id.
[60] Id.
[61] Armour & Company v. United States, 402 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1968).
[62] Marvin Hayenga, et al., Meat Packer Vertical Integration and Contract Linkages in the Beef and Pork Industries:  An Economic Perspective  47-49 (May 22, 2000) (hereinafter AMI Paper).
[63] Id.  at 48.
[64] Id. at 49.
[65] Cranfield, supra note 37, at 14-15.
[66] AMI paper, supra note 53, at 49-50.
[67] Schroeter and Azzam, supra note 28, at 29.  The report noted that the “significant price premia for marketing agreement cattle” were adjusted for quality. 
[68] Schroeter and Azzam, supra note 28, at 13 (stating that other economists, including Love and Burton, and Ward have cited evidence that packers pay more for cattle procured through marketing agreements than cattle purchased on the open market).
[69] U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4.
[70] Statement of Representative Tincher, 61 Cong. Rec. 1809 (1921).
[71] House Report No. 77, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1921).
[72] Jon Lauck, After Deregulation:  Constructing Agricultural Policy in the Age of “Freedom to Farm,” 5 Drake Journal of Agricultural Law 3, 8 (2000) (hereinafter After Deregulation) (noting that the “inequality of bargaining power” suffered by farmers has been “a persistent theme in agricultural policy debates for over a century,” and was an important motivation in much significant legislation, including the Interstate Commerce Act, the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, the Capper Volstead Act, and the Agricultural Fair Practices Act.).
[73] Jon Lauck, Toward an Agrarian Antitrust:  A New Direction for Agricultural Law, 75 North Dakota Law Review 449, 474 (1999) [hereinafter Agrarian Antitrust].
[74] See generally United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F.Supp. 1064, 1085 (D. Del. 1991) (recognizing that a merger that would increase the market power of a business that deals with horse tracks would leave the smaller facilities unprotected against anti-competitive price increases); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F.Supp. 34, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that independent pharmacies lacked power to bargain effectively with large wholesalers, stating “independent pharmacies have little leverage, as evidenced by the considerably higher upcharges they have to pay in comparison to thte retail chains and institutional GPO’s).
[75] Lauck, Agrarian Antitrust, supra note 66, at 476.
[76] See Mary Lou Steptoe, The New Merger Guidelines:  Have They Changed the Rules of the Game?, 61 Antitrust L.J. 493, 502 (1993).  In analyzing a market where the seller enjoys a power advantage (as opposed to the livestock market) Steptoe states:  “Relatively few industries will sell solely to large customers.  Far more common will be situations in which some buyers are large and some are small.  In such cases the large buyers may be able to protect themselves from supracompetitive pricing while the small buyers cannot.  If the seller is able to price-discriminate between these tow classes of customers, it will be able to raise the prices that it charges the smaller buyers.”
[77] Lauck, After Deregulation, supra note 63, at 36-42.
[78] Id. at 36 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451, 473-47 (1992)).
[79] Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition:  Kodak and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1, 15 (1994).
[80] Lauck, Agrarian Antitrust, supra note 64, at 480 (citing George Stigler, The Organization of Industry 172 (1968)).

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Blue Ribbons/Red Faces: Packer control of NCBA

by Lee Pitts

I did not attend this year’s NCBA Convention in Phoenix. I haven’t been
to one since I quit the organization four years ago. I know that as a
journalist I have a certain responsibility to report on such proceedings, but I could have told you before the convention what would transpire. Just as I speculated in this newspaper five years ago exactly what the NCBA would become if the merger was allowed to take place. It wasn’t hard to forecast. All you had to do was follow the money.

I remember the Alamo and the first NCBA Convention. When I left San
Antonio four years ago after the merger I felt we in the cattle industry had just been wiped out like those independent Texans of long ago. It was a massacre. There would be no survivors. The fact that I had worked very hard to raise some valid issues about the merger and ended up being being treated like the enemy was puzzling to me. But my biggest scar from the Alamo Convention was that I had been forever disillusioned with how the
“democratic” process DOESN’T work within our national trade organization.

A livestock magazine quoted me as saying I regretted putting up the fight
I did. Not really. I stand by everything I wrote and urge you to go back and read my work and see if I wasn’t right in my predictions. I only wish I would have been wrong. After reading this condensed report of what transpired at the NCBA Convention I think you’ll get the same uneasy feeling I experienced when first introduced to the NCBA.

You’re Stupid

I probably wasn’t smart enough to attend the NCBA Convention even if I
had wanted to go. At least that seems to be the opinion of Jon Ferguson, the
newly elected Chairman of the Beef Checkoff Division of the NCBA.

ITEM: During the Executive Committee meeting of January 26th Mr. Ferguson
made the following comment: “It is important for the decisions of the cattle
industry be made by this group (NCBA Executive Committee) of educated people
that are knowledgeable about the issues facing our industry. The large group
of grassroots producers we are always hearing about are not informed enough
or knowledgeable enough to understand these issues.”

I don’t profess to have the education of Mr. Ferguson who graduated from
Kansas State with a B.S. degree in the nuclear sciences and went to
Massachusetts Institute of Technology to pursue his doctorate with a
fellowship from the Atomic Energy Commission. But I do know one thing. In a
country or an organization you shouldn’t have to pass an IQ test in order to
participate. I’m also smart enough to recognize an arrogant and elitist
attitude when I bump up against it. But this is nothing new. Mr. Ferguson’s
statement could well be the motto of the NCBA.

Who Said There’s No Free Lunch?

One of my main concerns about the merger was that under the new industry
structure packers would have too much influence on the proposed organization
without having to pay fair market value for that influence! How un-American
is that?

ITEM: It’s now official policy that the NCBA will oppose any legislation
that would restrict packer ownership of livestock. That was always the
unofficial policy of the NCBA due to the strong influence that Texas and
Kansas cattle feeders have. Now, thanks to a balloting in the Stakeholder’s
Congress that included 191 voters, when that other Congress in Washington DC
visits this subject they will be advised officially that the million
cattlemen represented by the NCBA are against any legislation that would
prevent packers from controlling the market through direct ownership of
cattle.

By the way, this piece of NCBA legislation was officially given its
blessing by IBP head cattle buyer and NCBA Board member, Bruce Bass.

Swan Song

The theme for NCBA’s first convention of the millennium was “We Are
Family, Bold Initiatives for New Solutions.” What they were referring to were
the changes proposed by the much ballyhooed Blue Ribbon Commission. When
George Swan became president of the NCBA a year ago one of his first actions
was to appoint a Blue Ribbon Commission to review, evaluate and suggest
changes to the NCBA. This was in response to growing displeasure with the
NCBA. They were losing producer members and there was a growing consensus in
the country that the big packers and big feeders were taking control of the
organization.

At the time he created the Blue Ribbon Commission Swan said, “The next
two years will determine whether NCBA survives as a typical industry trade
organization or if it rises to become a meaningful catalyst for change.
Change is needed,” Swan said, “because things are not currently working as
well as they should be.”

After a year of countless meetings the Commission came up with several
ways to improve the NCBA. These included strengthening grassroots producer
influence by allowing only producers to vote on policy matters. (No car
companies and drug companies.) You may recall this was an issue I raised
editorially before the merger.

The commission also came up with several other suggestions. Such as:
creating a simpler, better understood organization; streamlining the board of
directors and committees; fostering a stronger state and national partnership.

ITEM: After hours of hotly contested debate at the NCBA Convention the
only action taken on the long awaited recommendations from the Blue Ribbon
Commission was to delay action. That’s right. The NCBA wants to debate some
more about the pros and cons of improving their organization. Should they or
shouldn’t they? The main emphasis of the Blue Ribbon Commission’s report was that only producers should be allowed to vote on policy decisions. The final vote was
135 to 125 in favor of non-producers continuing to have a vote on policy
issues.

Immediately after the much-hyped, non-event at Phoenix NCBA leaders felt
a conference call was necessary to explain to the livestock media what
exactly had transpired. NCBA officials said that those changes recommended by
the Blue Ribbon Commission that did not require by-law changes would be
implemented. Mostly this consisted of a $10 increase in individual dues.

I have a feeling this was not the dramatic change George Swan had in
mind. I’m told that after the balloting many NCBA’ers went home red-faced.
Some with anger and some were simply embarrassed by the proceedings.

Oh, they tried to put a happy face on the fiasco. But it would take Bill
Clinton’s Spin Doctors to make these results fly out in cow country. One
Montana cattle producer said, “After today’s fight we have killed, mutilated
and pulled the baby apart. We now have an organization no one wants and we
are looking for a place to discard the remains.”

We can only hope so!

Plaques And Parties

I have always objected to the NCBA using their quasi-governmental status
and authority to advocate a radical restructuring of the cattle industry in
favor of a multi-national corporate system along the lines of pork and
poultry. But it’s when NCBA’ers rub our noses in their importance that I
become most upset. Like when they throw parties for themselves, give each
other plaques and fly all over the country at our expense and then lecture us
that we owe them something for their sacrifice.

ITEM: In cooperation with Bayer Animal Health the NCBA presented their
Vision Award for Best Beef Innovator of the year to U.S. Premium Beef of
Missouri. According to industry observer, Mike Callicrate, “U.S. Premium Beef
continues to be lauded by NCBA, when in fact U.S. Premium Beef has actually
hurt cattlemen by doing nothing more than provide Farmland with price
depressing captive supplies. This is unbelievable. USPB cattle producer
members actually invested their own hard earned money to further wreck their
own market.”

I’m sure they’ll appreciate the plaque though.

So You Know Where You Stand

According to Jon Ferguson, we aren’t smart enough to understand the
issues faced by our industry. So, just in case someone asks, here’s you’re
official position as stipulated by NCBA staffers and officers during the past
four years.

ITEM: The new President of the NCBA is George Hall, retired president of
the Oklahoma Stockyards. In the January 2000 issue of Beef Magazine Hall
responded to the recent string of mega-mergers in the retail food industry as
being a benefit to the beef industry because there are fewer players to
influence. Good thing there are only three big packers left: Easier to keep
an eye on them this way, right George?

ITEM: In testimony on behalf of the NCBA George Swan last year testified
before the US Senate Committee on Agriculture that his organization
represented one million cattle ranchers and the NCBA supported the World
Trade Organization and funding and authority given to the International
Monetary Fund. Which is currently helping other countries expand their beef
exports to this country.

ITEM: NCBA joined Cargill, ConAgra, Continental Grain, Farmland, General
Mills, Nestle and Dreyfus as members in the Ag for Fast Track Coalition. This
will allow our domestic beef market to be further inundated with beef from
around the world.

ITEM: NCBA’s Chief Economist, Chuck Lambert, wrote a memo to the House
and Senate Ag Committees opposing a proposal from the Western Organization of
Resource Councils. It sought to restore some competition into the pricing of
fed livestock. Lambert advised that no action should be taken to alter or
halt current trends because that is the direction where NCBA’s Long Range
Plan says the industry must go.

ITEM: The NCBA rejected a proposed study on the impact of beef imports
although we’ve had several studies to show how we’re all benefiting from beef
exports.

ITEM: The NCBA opposed legislation that would have halted temporarily the
biggest agricultural mergers.

ITEM: In announcing a partnership venture with IBP, NCBA described it as
“a great marriage between two organizations that share a common vision.”

ITEM: NCBA opposed R-CALF’s anti-dumping case against Mexico and stayed
neutral on R-CALF’s case against Canada.

ITEM: Chandler Keys, NCBA’s head lobbyist in Washington on behalf of over
one million producers from across the country had a letter read into the
Congressional Record proclaiming that the nation’s cattle industry opposed
Tom Daschle’s amendments on mandatory live cattle price reporting and packer
concentration.

I don’t remember being asked how I felt on the matter, do you?

ITEM: At their mid-winter convention the Wyoming Stockgrowers passed a
unanimous resolution calling for the removal of the same Chandler Keys as
NCBA’s VP of Policy. A similar resolution came out of New Mexico.

In a letter to NCBA President Swan and NCBA CEO, Chuck Schroeder, the
Wyoming delegation summarized their displeasure in three areas: “(1) Our
members cite numerous examples of the Washington office of NCBA taking a
conciliatory position in early negotiations on issues critical to our
industry as opposed to adhering firmly to NCBA policy. (2) Our leadership has
been advised by both staff of our Congressional delegation and senior staff
of allied organizations that they find it difficult to work with Mr. Keys.
(3) Our producers who have had direct contacts with Mr. Keys, either in
person or through phone calls, feel that he is unable to relate to the
business challenges and cultures of the western cattle producer.”

Mr. Keys remains firmly entrenched in his NCBA Washington office.

Where Are They Now?

Four years ago all the living former NCA Presidents endorsed the merger
that created the NCBA. In retrospect, the industry structure it has created
has been beneficial for some. JoAnn Smith, Past NCA President sits on the
Board of Directors of IBP. John Lacey, NCBA’s first President, is currently
promoting a strategic alliance for the largest feeder/packer in California. I
did find one former NCA President who had the courage to admit he made a
mistake in supporting the merger. Jack Dahl regrets supporting it because he
feels the NCBA is now out of touch with grassroots producers. “It’s
considered an enemy by many grassroots producers because they don’t feel
their national organization is serving and protecting their interests any
more.”

I’ll bet if Jack Dahl showed up at this year’s NCBA Convention there were
a few tickets to exclusive cocktail parties missing from his convention
package.

Jack Dahl has suggested in interviews printed elsewhere that disgruntled
ranchers may feel they have only one option left to get rid of the NCBA and
that’s voting out the checkoff. (If ever given a chance by the USDA). Our
all-knowing NCBA leaders can blame whoever they want for losing the goose
that is laying all those golden eggs but I’d suggest they have only their
arrogance to blame. But then, what do I know? I’m just one of those
uneducated grassroots dummies out in cow country.

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